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Abstract
On October 21, 2005, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Stephen J. McGuire had ordered Evanston Northwest-
ern Healthcare Corporation (ENH) to divest Highland Park Hospital, located in a
Chicago suburb. (The decision can be found at http://www.ftc. gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversion.
pdf.) ENH had acquired Highland Park five years ago for $200 million. In an
administrative complaint issued in February 2004, the FTC alleged that the acqui-
sition had resulted in “substantially lessened competition” and higher prices for
insurers and healthcare consumers for general acute care inpatient services sold to
managed care organizations. In upholding part of the complaint, Judge McGuire
evaluated post-acquisition evidence that ”ENH exercised its enhanced post-merger
market power to obtain price increases significantly above its premerger prices and
substantially larger than price increases obtained by other comparison hospitals.”
(ENH has filed notice that it will appeal the judge’s initial decision to the full
Commission.)
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On October 21, 2005, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) announced 
that Administrative Law Judge Stephen 
J. McGuire had ordered Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation 
(ENH) to divest Highland Park Hospital, 
located in a Chicago suburb.1 (The 
decision can be found at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversion.
pdf.) ENH had acquired Highland 
Park ﬁve years ago for $200 million. In 
an administrative complaint issued in 
February 2004, the FTC alleged that the 
acquisition had resulted in “substantially 
lessened competition” and higher prices 
for insurers and healthcare consumers 
for general acute care inpatient services 
sold to managed care organizations.2 In 
upholding part of the complaint, Judge 
McGuire evaluated post-acquisition 
evidence that “ENH exercised its 
enhanced post-merger market power to 
obtain price increases signiﬁcantly above 
its premerger prices and substantially 
larger than price increases obtained by 
other comparison hospitals.”3 (ENH has 
ﬁled notice that it will appeal the judge’s 
initial decision to the full Commission.) 
Judge McGuire’s decision is notable 
for two reasons. First, it reverses a 
“string of government losses in hospital 
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1.  In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
Initial Decision, Oct. 20, 2005, Docket No. 9315, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/
051020initialdecision.pdf. See also, FTC Press Release, Administrative Law Judge Orders Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare Corporation to Sell Highland Park Hospital, Oct. 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/10/evanston.htm.
2.  In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
Complaint, Feb. 10, 2004, Docket No. 9315, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0110234/
040210emhcomplaint.pdf.
3.  In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
Initial Decision, p. 1.
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merger cases over the last decade.”4 
Second, and more notably for those 
outside the hospital ﬁeld, the decision 
is a stark reminder that merging parties 
are not immune from antitrust scrutiny 
after their deal closes. Under Section 
7 of the Clayton Act, the US antitrust 
agencies retain authority to investigate 
transactions after they close. Indeed, 
they retain this authority even when 
the agencies had previously cleared the 
transaction in the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
review process. And the agencies can 
seek divestiture of the acquired assets or 
other remedies if the merger is found to 
have resulted in anticompetitive effects.
I. Hospital Mergers
The government had previously challenged 
several hospital mergers based on 
arguments about probable anticompetitive 
effects, but had lost most of those cases. 
By contrast, here, the FTC presented 
evidence of actual price increases post-
merger. The transaction combined ENH’s 
two hospitals in the northern Chicago 
suburbs (Evanston and Glenbrook) with 
Highland Park Hospital, the nearest 
hospital north of them. Judge McGuire 
found that as a result of ENH’s acquisition 
of Highland Park and elimination of it 
as a competitor, ENH increased its rate 
structures for managed care organizations 
above what any of the hospitals could have 
achieved themselves absent the acquisition. 
Judge McGuire wrote, “[A]s as soon as 
the merger was consummated, [ENH] 
began using its enhanced market power 
to impose signiﬁcant price increases on 
managed care organizations, and ultimately 
consumers.”5 Further, he found that ENH 
continued unilaterally to raise its rates in 
2002 and 2003, such that it “signiﬁcantly 
increased the prices paid by managed 
care organizations for ENH services.”6 
Judge McGuire concluded that the FTC’s 
evidence effectively ruled out factors 
other than the exercise of market power 
as explaining the price increases.7 The 
administrative law judge’s decision may 
encourage the FTC to bring pre-closing 
challenges to future hospital mergers, 
despite the Commission’s losing streak 
in the courts. The FTC now has a useful 
precedent where a decisionmaker found 
actual anticompetitive effects based on 
post-closing evidence. The Commission 
may determine that this precedent (and 
empirical evidence about competitive 
harm from completed hospital mergers) 
will make courts more willing to enjoin 
acquisitions than they had been based 
on the FTC’s traditional arguments about 
likely post-closing competitive effects. 
II. A Broader Message
Although the US antitrust agencies 
conduct the vast majority of their 
reviews of large mergers and acquisitions 
prospectively through the Hart-Scott-
2
4.  In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
Initial Decision, p. 137. In many of those cases, courts found that the government had failed to prove 
a relevant geographic market within which the merger would harm competition. Id. at 137-8, citing 
Tenet Health Care 186 F.3d at 1053 (characterizing the FTC’s failure to produce sufﬁcient evidence 
of a well-deﬁned relevant geographic market as fatal to the government’s claim); Freeman Hosp. 69 
F. 3d at 272 (describing the FTC’s failure to meet its burden of establishing the relevant geographic 
market as dispositive); Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. at 987 (“The government has failed to establish 
the relevant geographic area and hence has failed to establish that the merger. . . will likely result in 
anticompetitive effects.”).
5.  Id. at 166.
6.  Id. at 1.
7.  Id. at 2.
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Rodino (HSR) Premerger Notiﬁcation 
process,8 Judge McGuire’s decision 
to force ENH to divest Highland Park 
Hospital serves as a reminder that they 
can also review transactions post-closing. 
In another post-closing review, the FTC 
sued The Hearst Corporation in 2001 for 
disgorgement of monopoly proﬁts from 
the acquisition by its subsidiary First Data 
Bank of Medi-Span. First Data Bank and 
Medi-Span owned the two commonly 
used drug information databases. 
Although the transaction had closed 
in 1988, evidence that the combined 
entity signiﬁcantly raised prices after the 
transaction led the Commission staff 
to conduct a post-closing investigation. 
The FTC found that the deal created a 
monopoly in the sale of drug information 
databases, and that First DataBank used 
that monopoly power substantially to 
increase prices to all database customers. 
To settle charges, Hearst ultimately 
agreed to disgorge $19 million in proﬁts 
and divest the Medi-Span business.9 
Hearst’s troubles were compounded 
by the FTC’s ﬁndings that Hearst had 
failed to include certain signiﬁcant 
4(c) documents in its HSR ﬁling for 
the transaction.10 Indeed, this HSR 
violation likely contributed to the FTC’s 
decision to challenge the transaction 
over a decade after closing. The FTC’s 
investigation of ENH, however, appears 
to be driven solely by the post-closing 
price increases that ENH instituted.
Other recent examples of post-closing 
reviews by the agencies include Chicago 
Bridge & Iron and Aspen Technologies. In 
October 2001, the FTC ﬁled a complaint 
seeking to undo Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Company’s February 2001 acquisition of 
Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. According to the 
FTC’s complaint, the transaction resulted 
in a monopoly in markets for LNG 
tanks and thermal vacuum chambers. In 
addition, the complaint alleged that the 
combination created a dominant ﬁrm 
in the US markets for LPG tanks and 
LIN/LOX/LAR tanks.11 An administrative 
law judge held the acquisition unlawful, 
and the full Commission upheld the 
decision in December 2004.12
The Aspen Technologies case involved a 
post-closing challenge to an acquisition 
that was not reportable under the HSR 
Act. In August 2003, the FTC ﬁled an 
administrative complaint alleging that 
software developer Aspen Technologies’s 
May 2002 acquisition of Hyprotech 
for $106 million violated the Clayton 
Act. The FTC sought divestiture of 
3
8.  Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). The premerger notiﬁcation provisions are in Section 7A 
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.
9.  FTC Press Release, Hearst Corp. To Disgorge $19 Million and Divest Business to Facts and 
Comparisons to Settle FTC Complaint, Dec. 14, 2001. Available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/12/
hearst.htm.
10.  Id. 
11.  In the Matter of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V., Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, and Pitt-
Des Moines, Inc., Administrative Complaint, Oct. 25, 2001, FTC File No. 011 0015, Docket No. 9300 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm.
12.  FTC Press Release, Administrative Law Judge Upholds Allegations of Anticompetitive Acquisition 
by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, June 27, 2003, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/cbi.
htm. The case is currently on appeal to the 5th Circuit. In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Docket No. 
9300, 2004 WL 3118878 (FTC Dec. 21, 2004), petition for review ﬁled (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2005).
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Hyprotech to restore competition in 
the market for engineering simulation 
software.13 Aspen eventually agreed to 
a consent order requiring divestiture 
of certain Hyprotech assets.14 
The agencies do not take lightly decisions 
to challenge transactions that have already 
closed.15 One of the most signiﬁcant 
advantages of the HSR Premerger review 
process is to reduce the business and 
market uncertainties caused by post-
closing challenges to transactions.16 It 
is both costly and disruptive to force 
a company to divest assets that have 
been integrated into the operations of 
another business. By contrast, under 
the HSR process, ﬁrms generally know 
before closing whether a particular 
transaction will be challenged. They can 
then make informed decisions whether 
to negotiate a settlement, abandon the 
transaction, or litigate.17 As importantly, 
the antitrust agencies have an opportunity 
to challenge transactions before closing, 
after which it will often be difﬁcult or 
impossible to impose remedies that 
effectively restore competition. 
Post-closing investigations generally 
begin when customers or competitors 
of the merged entity report potential 
anticompetitive behavior to one of the 
antitrust agencies. The agencies will 
then investigate whether there have 
been signiﬁcant price increases or other 
anticompetitive effects attributable to 
the transaction.18 To decide whether to 
issue a complaint, the agency determines 
whether any anticompetitive effects 
resulted from the transaction or whether 
they were caused by some exogenous 
factor (such as increases in input costs). 
In essence, the analysis is whether the 
merger, itself, harmed competition. 
Unlike with pre-closing investigations, the 
agencies have the beneﬁt of hindsight.
Although the US antitrust agencies have 
challenged relatively few transactions 
post-closing, they have conducted many 
more investigations that did not lead to 
challenges. Even an investigation that does 
not lead the agency to ﬁle a complaint can 
be very costly. The agency typically issues 
a Conﬁdential Information Demand (CID), 
which typically calls for a voluminous 
document production and formal 
responses to questions that can demand 
time and attention from key employees.
Finally, premerger HSR notiﬁcation 
does not provide a safe-harbor against 
post-closing review. Although the 
agencies may be slightly more reticent to 
challenge a consummated merger that 
they have already reviewed through the 
HSR process, their clearance letters to 
4
13.  Aspen Technologies, Inc., Administrative Complaint, Dec. 20, 2004, Docket No. 9310 available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf.
14.  FTC Press Release, FTC Orders Aspen Technology, Inc. to Divest Assets from its 2002 Purchase of 
Hyprotech, Jul. 15, 2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/aspen.htm.
15.  See, e.g., William J. Baer, “Reﬂections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act,” Prepared Remarks before The Conference Board, Oct. 29, 1996 at fn 58.
16.  Congress intended the HSR Act to alleviate the inefﬁciency of post-merger review. See FTC v. H.J. 
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001), citing 119 Cong. Rec. 36612 (1973).
17.  Id.
18.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Administrative Complaint, cited supra; 
Aspen Technologies, Inc., Complaint, Dec. 20, 2004, Docket No. 9310, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf; MSC Software Corp., Complaint, Aug. 14, 2002, Docket No. 9299 available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/11/mscdo.pdf. 
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merging parties on completion of HSR 
review are only a statement of present 
intention not to challenge the proposed 
transaction. The agencies reserve the 
right to revisit the decision if post-merger 
evidence suggests that the combined 
ﬁrm has exercised market power as a 
result of the transaction.19 Whether 
they do so will generally turn on factors 
such as the quantum of anticompetitive 
effects from the transaction, the number 
and force of complaints, and whether 
there is an available remedy that is 
likely to restore lost competition. 
In addition, it is possible for states to 
challenge closed transactions under 
their own or federal law and for private 
parties to bring suits post-closing 
under Section 7 or analogous state 
laws. Although challenges by state 
authorities have been rarer in recent 
years, private challenges to mergers 
have been more common (but such 
challenges have rarely been successful). 
The Evanston Northwestern Healthcare 
case stands as a reminder not to confuse 
the closing of a transaction with an 
exemption from further antitrust scrutiny. 
Merging parties should be cognizant that 
sharply raising prices or other post-closing 
conduct that may agitate consumers or 
other market participants can create 
risks of a burdensome and expensive 
antitrust investigation as well as unwinding 
of the transaction and other remedies.  
James Lowe and Alexander Krulic   
authored this update.
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19.  The Clayton Antitrust Act also permits private challenges mergers that violate Section 7, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12 et seq. (1914).
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